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Abstract
During the last 2-3 years, the integration (or rather non-integration) 
of migrants has become the burning issue of Russian migration. 
The reason has its roots in the growth of inter-ethnic tension and 
manifestations of open nationalism, which are in turn the result of 
people’s wider discontent with social inequality and administrative 
dereliction combined with a crisis in national self-identification. 
Ineffective migration management, resulting in wide-scale irregular 
migration, exasperates Russian society and fuels social strain.
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What was the Russian integration 
policy after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and how has it evolved?
A In the 1990s, the integration of migrants was not 
seen as an integral part of State migration policy for 
objective reasons. Initially, migration inflow to Russia 
consisted primarily of: 1) Russian people who found 
themselves in other Soviet republics during the time 
of the USSR’s disintegration or 2) representatives 
of other nationalities of the USSR who had been 
perceived as citizens of a single country. These 
migrants did not face the problem of knowledge 
of the Russian language. They had relatively high 
levels of education. In their employment, they also 
benefited from the formerly-common system of skills 
training and unified qualification requirements. All 
these factors made their integration in Russia easier, 
even if they were ethnically distanced migrants from 
Central Asian republics or Transcaucasia.
In this period, the Russian migration policy adhered 
to a laissez-faire position and made no efforts to 
elaborate integration mechanisms to make migrants’ 
entry into the Russian society smoother. In many 
cases, it was rather on the contrary. Elaborated in a 
hurry, migration legislation put many migrants who 
had arrived to Russia in 1990s with Soviet passports 
in a situation in which they found themselves 
unable to obtain Russian citizenship due to their 
failure to comply with various formal criteria, lack 
of certain papers, missing archives, etc. Therefore, 
they unexpectedly found themselves without legal 
status in Russia. By the end of 1990s the number of 
such “non-status” migrants was estimated to be up 
to 3 million.1 Gradually, by fair means or foul, many 
of them managed to become legalized in Russia. 
However, even now, the number of “non-status” 
migrants who stay in Russia for the long term is 
estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands and 
their integration is seriously complicated
Now, however, after over two decades of post-
Soviet history, integration issues are focused on 
fundamentally different categories of migrants. 
These are: 1) migrants who arrived in Russia from 
former Soviet republics for permanent residence. 
They consisted mainly of titular nations from 
these republics and most of them benefited from 
the facilitated procedure of obtaining Russian 
citizenship that was granted to CIS citizens. (Their 
total inflow was about 1.8 million between 2000 and 
2012); and 2) migrant workers who come to Russia 
from CIS states, primarily Central Asia, in search of 
employment. (Their numbers are estimated to be 3 
to 5 million, including unregistered migrants). These 
are mostly people who were born, or at least grew 
up, in the new sovereign states which were distanced 
from Russia. In these states, belonging to one’s own 
nation was stressed and Russian language was forced 
out of the schools and everyday life. These migrants 
definitely need support in their adaptation in Russia.
In this “new wave” of migrants, migrant workers 
are a matter of particular concern. Most of them 
are young people who have very low levels of 
knowledge of the Russian language, no skills, and no 
knowledge of Russian laws, rules and norms. They 
go to Russia because, on the one hand, their local 
labour market is not providing them with jobs, and 
because on the other hand, there is a stereotype of 
model behaviour in their countries: “one should go 
to Russia for earnings”. This stereotype is supported 
by ethnic social networks which have formed during 
the last two decades, and by networks of criminal 
ethnic mediator-recruiters who have made labour 
migration from their countries a profitable business
1 Vladimir Iontsev, Irina Ivakhnyuk, Russia in world migration flows: 
trends of the last decade (1992-2001 // The World in the Mirror of 
International Migration. Scientific series “International Migration 
of the Population: Russia and the Contemporary World”. Edited by 
Vladimir Iontsev. Volume 10. Moscow: MAKS Press, 2002: http://
www.demostudy.ru/library/
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Figure 1. Remittances from Russia to CIS states, transferred by foreign physical persons via official money  
     transferring systems
What issues are linked and contribute 
to irregular migration in Russia?
The Russian foreign labour legislation established in 
2007 provides a relatively liberal and clear procedure 
for labour migrants from CIS states to become 
officially registered and to obtain a work permit in 
Russia by themselves. Even after restrictions were 
introduced in 2009 as a response to the economic 
crisis, migrants have had an opportunity to change 
employers within their initial three months of stay 
in Russia. However, during the past 4-5 years this 
procedure has become absolutely impossible for 
migrants to access directly without middlemen. 
A network of shadow mediators stands between 
migrants and the legal labour market, benefiting 
from migrants’ ignorance of the rules and lack of 
knowledge of Russian language. As a result, getting 
a work permit costs migrants not less than 30,000 
rubles (700 euro). Therefore, the majority of migrant 
workers who come to Russia are employed without 
permission, i.e. irregularly. 
The irregularity and isolation of migrants is combined 
with their growing numbers. While official data on 
formally-employed foreign workers demonstrates a 
declining trend since the 2008-2009 crisis, statistics 
on remittances prove the contrary. The Russian 
Central Bank data shows that already in 2010 the 
amounts of money transferred by foreign physical 
persons from Russia via official money-transferring 
systems—Russian analogous of Western Union and 
the main channel of migrant remittances—went up 
sharply and continued growing in further years (Table 
1). This data is an indirect illustration of the growing 
number of migrants in Russia. In combination with 
official statistics they are the evidence of the growing 
sector of irregular migration. Even Konstantin 
Romodanovsky, Director of the Federal Migration 
Service of Russia, acknowledged in his recent 
interview that within the last four years (2009-2012) 
the total migrant inflow to Russia increased by 
over 1/3 and that the new tough rules for migrant 
lawbreakers are aimed at reducing the irregular stay 
and employment of foreign workers.2 
2 “There should be a civilized stick”. Interview with Konstantin 
Romodanovsky, Director of the Federal Migration Service of 






















* 2013 - Data for I-III quarters.  
 Source: Central Bank of 
Russia: http://www.cbr.ru/
statistics/?Prtid=svs
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Irregular – and therefore uncontrolled – migration 
is a source of migration-related tension in Russia. 
Police regularly extract bribes from migrants without 
documents. As the main beneficiary of large numbers 
of irregular migrants, the police are interested in 
maintaining the status quo rather than combating 
the causes of irregular migration. On the other hand, 
irregular migration is effectively used by authorities 
as a buffer to re-direct public exasperation with 
internal socio-political problems to the “inevitable” 
challenges of migration.
During election campaigns, all the parties and 
candidates led by the dominating public opinion 
emphasize migration-related problems (exaggerated 
criminality, socially dangerous disease risks, 
cultural distance, labour and wage dumping, 
pressure on Russian identity) rather than proposing 
improvements in migration policy, such as the 
integration of migrants.  The most recent example 
is the election of the mayor of Moscow in early 
September 2013. The election campaign was 
followed by numerous spot checks against irregular 
migrants and even the construction of encampments 
for hundreds of detained migrants subjected to 
deportation in the territory of the capital city. 
Inspired by politicians and authorities, media plays 
locals against migrants by focusing on criminal news 
in which people with a “different shape of eyes” are 
involved. This only further contributes to the “anti-
migrant hysteria”.3
What are some of the internal inter-
ethnic integration challenges?
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the unity 
of the “Soviet people” collapsed. In the sovereign 
Russian Federation, where multi-ethnicity had been 
an element of Russian culture and national self-
consciousness for many years, the feeling of the unity 
of the nation corroded. Ethnic Russians comprise 
80% of the total population of Russia but in addition, 
over 190 indigenous nationalities live traditionally 
in the territory of the Russian Federation. With the 
current heightened ethno-sensitiveness of Russians, 
any kind of “encroachment” on Russianness is 
perceived painfully.
Stressing the challenges of international migration 
is often used to mask internal ethnic-based 
conflicts.  Difficult socio-economic situations in the 
North Caucasus republics – Chechnya, Dagestan, 
Ingushetia – and mass migration from these 
republics to other Russian regions has provoked 
anti-Caucasus sentiments. However, this is an issue 
of internal policy that is correlated with the political 
integrity of the Russian Federation. A delicate and 
consistent inter-ethnic policy is needed. 
At the highest political level, confusion between 
growing Russian nationalism and the inflow of 
migrants was articulated by Vladimir Putin in his 
manifesto-like article “Russia: An Inter-Ethnic 
Issue,” published in January 2012.   He recognized 
people’s fears of migration and called for a tough 
migration policy in order to protect the national self-
identification of Russians. This article has had a great 
impact on the Concept of the State Migration Policy 
of the Russian Federation through 2025 (approved 
by the Decree of President Putin on June 13th, 2012) 
and the Strategy of the State Inter-Ethnic Policy of 
the Russian Federation through 2025 (approved by 
a Decree of President Putin on 19 December 2012). 
Both strategic documents seem unable to reduce 
inter-ethnic tension in the least. The growth of 
tension is demonstrated both in the results of public 
opinion polls (Figure 2) and in everyday routines. 
With the State’s inaction with respect to the provision 
of order and safety for local population, xenophobia 
in minds turns into xenophobia in actions.
3 As defined by Lidia Grafova, Russian journalist and President of 
the NGO “Migration Communities Forum” (cited from: Migration 
XXI century, № 4(19) 2013, p.18 (in Russian): http://mirpal.org/
migrjournal.html)
4 See http://www.putin-itogi.ru/2012/01/23/statya-v-v-putina-
rossiya-nacionalnyj-vopros/ (accessed 31March, 2014).
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Figure 2. Growth of interethnic tension and anti-migrant perceptions reflected by the results of public   
     opinion polls* 2008-2013
	  
* Polls included a sample of 1500 respondents drawn from urban and rural populations aged 18+ in 130 localities of 45 
administrative units throughout Russia. Statistic inaccuracy of the results of these pools is considered less than 3.4%.
 Source: Levada-Center Independent Analytical Service, November 5th, 2013 : http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-
migratsii-i-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti
Recent anti-immigrant riots have shown that 
nationalism and xenophobia are not the preserve 
of a few extremists but are turning rapidly into a 
leading mainstream concern. People feel unsafe and 
unprotected in the face of growing numbers of aliens 
while municipal administration and police dissociate 
themselves from safeguarding social cohesion. 
The anti-immigrant confrontations in Moscow5 
demonstrated several lessons to the local and federal 
authorities: 1) society has explosively disintegrated 
and applies a ‘friend-or-foe’ identification system 
based on ethnic factors; 2) police corruption and 
administrative dereliction result in a distrust of the 
Law and State and drive people to solve emerging 
conflicts by mob law; 3) even without instigation from 
radical nationalistic organizations, people are highly 
sensitive to ethnic-based discord; 4) politicians’ anti-
migrant rhetoric fuels public anti-migrant riots.
Concluding remarks
Migration issues in Russia have been closely linked 
with the painful process of post-Soviet national 
identity-building. While initially, migrant integration 
was not a major policy concern, the subsequent 
years have proved the need for such policy. With the 
economic and demographic need to further attract 
foreign workers, a well-elaborated and consistent 
integration policy is important. The challenge is 
will a growing xenophobic aggression among the 
local population and – in response – an increasingly 
aggressive ethnic solidarity among aliens. In this 
situation, the current shaping of the “State philosophy 
of ‘anti-migration-ism’”, which is called to justify the 
inability of the authorities to cope with migration 
management, plants a time-bomb under social 
cohesion in Russia.  
5 The most recent resonant case in the Moscow administrative district Biryulyovo, in October 2013, demonstrated that anger about migrants 
has reached the boiling point. The murder of a 25-year-old Russian man who was stabbed to death by a man of “non-Slavic appearance” 
triggered a spontaneous wave of pogroms
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